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ABSTRACT
This work fits in the context of community migrogrids,
where entities of a community can exchange energy and
services among them without going through the usual
channels of the public grid. We propose and analyze so-
lutions methods to operate a community and to share the
profit gained by the community between the entities form-
ing the community, especially when the cost and revenues
originate from different streams.
INTRODUCTION
This work fits in the context of energy communities, where
entities of a community can exchange energy and services
among them [1] without going through the usual chan-
nels of the public grid. It is practically motivated by the
need arising from the pilot project MeryGrid [2], in which
several companies and a storage system form a commu-
nity microgrid. By community microgrid, we mean a spe-
cial case of energy community that is a geographically
limited power system made of several legal entities, each
entity being a single-user microgrid with its own genera-
tion, consumption, storage, and level of flexibility. In this
case, an operator manages the community in order to reach
the highest economic efficiency by optimizing the energy
flows and the interactions within the community and with
the public grid, while satisfying the constraints set by the
entities and constraints of the public grid (Figure 1). Leav-
ing aside the (re)sizing and long term contracting ques-
tions, the operation of a microgrid can be divided in several
phases, from day-ahead bidding to settlement. Although
all these decision stages should be designed in a coher-
ent way, this paper considers only the operational planning
stage that optimizes decisions one day ahead with periods
of 15 minutes given some prices, consumption and gen-
eration forecasts. The main focus of this paper is how to
share the profit gained by the community between the enti-
ties forming the community, especially when the cost and
revenues originate from different streams: an entity gener-
ates revenues from energy sales, either to the grid or to the
community, and from ancillary services to the grid; energy
purchases from the grid and from the community as well
as peak penalties constitute the costs of an entity. The re-
search questions addressed are, assuming we can solve the
operational planning problem of an entity to optimality (i)
how should we formulate the operational planning prob-
lem of the community and the mechanism that shares the

















Figure 1: Community model
the operator? (ii) How fair is the mechanism and how does
it incentivize the entities to join or stay in a community?
A way to price electricity and heat in local communities
was proposed in [3], but only focused on the energy com-
modity. A fair economic settlement scheme for partici-
pants in a microgrid is proposed in [4], which considers
the sizing problem but is limited to the electricity commod-
ity. In a multi-TSO coordination context, [5] introduces a
methodology and reviews some fairness notions that are of
interest and are adapted to our problem in this paper. This
topic is becoming of foremost importance with the rise of
energy communities [6].
Starting from the operational planning problem of a sin-
gle entity, we formulate the community operational plan-
ning problem of the operator. Then we propose and dis-
cuss three schemes to allocate the profit gained by this
community-level optimization. Fairness is a subjective no-
tion, but some indicators allow us to compare profit sharing
mechanisms based on the solutions they lead to on a spe-
cific microgrid. Illustrative results are reported for a case
inspired by the MeryGrid project [2].
MATHEMATICAL MODEL
Entities are indexed by the letter u and grouped in the set
U . The superscript SU denotes a quantity relative to an en-
tity (a single-user) and the superscript MU denotes a quan-
tity relative to the community (multi-user). The devices
of an entity are modeled as follows. The devices consum-
ing electricity fall in three categories: inflexible demand
must be satisfied, hence can be seen as demand at maxi-
mum price; flexible demand must be satisfied as well but
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is specified as an amount of energy to be dispatched over
the planning horizon; sheddable demand is not at maxi-
mum price and can be partially shed. On the generation
side, devices fall in two categories: steerable generation,
e.g. diesel generator, with a known fuel cost, rated power
and efficiency, and non-steerable generation which is zero
marginal cost but causes a loss of revenue if curtailed. Fi-
nally, storage devices are characterized by a rated power,
energy capacity, charge and discharge efficiencies. The
electrical network connecting the entities is not modelled.
This paper does not make assumptions on the position of
the entities within the public grid, but assumes a regula-
tory mechanism is available to allow metering flows that
stay within the community and flows that are exchanged
with the public grid.
The mathematical models we discuss next are mixed inte-
ger linear problems, but we do not totally detail them here
for concision reasons.
Single-user optimization
Problem (1)–(3) is a condensed version of the problem a
single-user not having access to the community could solve
to plan its operations and maximize its profit over a time




s.t. gu(au,xu)≤ 0 (2)
hu(au,xu)≤ 0 (3)
The decision variables of the problem are divided in two
categories: the vector au collects the actions taken over the
planning horizon, for instance the charge or discharge set
points of a battery, and the vector xu represents the state
evolution of the system, for instance the state of charge
of a battery. The objective (1) is to minimize the cost of
electricity purchased from the external grid, of steerable
generation, of curtailment, of shedding, and of the peak
penalty, and to maximize incomes from sales of energy and
services to the external grid. Constraints are divided in two
sets: (2) collects all the constraints related to the devices of
an entity, such as constraints defining the battery state of
charge evolution and the load flexibility models, while (3)
collects the energy balance constraints, the reserve levels
definition, and the peak model, i.e. constraints related to
interactions between the public grid and the entity.
Community optimization
We now turn to the problem of managing a community (cf.
Figure 1). We optimize the energy flows and costs for each
entity, but the operational plan is established for the com-
munity globally, satisfying the local constraints of all the
entities. Each entity can now either exchange with the pub-
lic grid or with the community, which is designed to offer
several advantage to the community members:
• exchanges within the community are executed at a
price that is more attractive than the public grid price;
• reserve is pooled over entities and is exchanged with
the grid at the community level;
• the peak penalty is reduced, since the peak that is pe-
nalized is the peak of the community and not the en-
tity peaks taken separately.
A fee γc applies on intra-community exchanges to remu-
nerate the microgrid operator, Similarly, a fee γb on battery
inflows and outflows remunerates the battery owners.
We denote by a′u and x′u the vectors of state and actions
variables that are augmented to account for energy ex-
changes of an entity with the community, and by ac the
vector of community level decision variables. Problem












u)≤ 0 ∀u ∈U (6)
h(a′,ac,x′)≤ 0 (7)
where a′ = (a′1, . . . ,a
′
|U |) and x
′ = (x′1, . . . ,x
′
|U |) gather the
actions and states of all the entities, respectively, (6) re-
places (3) to account for the new exchange possibility of
an entity within the community, and (7) constrains com-
munity level decisions.
Solving this optimization problem implicitly defines ex-
changes between entities of the community, but does not
explicitly determine how the profit increase, defined as
PMU = J?,MU− ∑
u∈U
J?,SUu ≥ 0,
is shared between the entities. Note that PMU ≥ 0 holds
since γc and γb are known a priori, and in the worst case
all entities behave as if they were alone without exchanges
within the community. We thus now need to find a way to
share PMU among the entities, and to do this in a fair and
transparent manner.
Notions of fairness and fairness indicators
Before entering in the details of the solution methods we
propose, we first discuss the notions of fairness that are
used as design principles, and can to some extent provide
indicators assess the fairness of a profit sharing design [5].
1. Freedom from envy is considered as a necessary con-
dition for fairness. It states, in summary, that all en-
tities are treated equally, i.e. without using any entity
specific information. In all approaches below, this is
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treated by design since the same methodology is ap-
plied to everyone and we try as much as possible to lift
indeterminacies that may lead to arbitrary decisions
that could bias the results in favor of some entities.
2. Efficiency states that solutions obtained should be
close to optimal, else an entity could claim a better
solution exists and find the selected solution unfair.
3. Accountability states that more effort of an entity
should result in more gain for that entity. This can
be assessed for instance through a sensitivity analy-
sis by loosening (resp. tightening) the constraints of
an entity and assessing how his profit share increases
(resp. decreases).
4. Altruism, in our interpretation, states that a member
should have no interest in degrading the profit of an-
other member (e.g. to increase his profit directly) if
it changes nothing to his position. This notion is dif-
ficult to assess in practice but we try to apply some
principles to tend towards an altruist design.
Method 1: Ex post profit sharing
A first idea is a two-stage approach that first solves (4)–
(7), then determines an invoice per entity that shares PMU
and imposes no entity loses with respect to its lonely po-
sition. This is doable but has a main disadvantage: since
the rule used to share the profit is not known by the opti-
mization problem, the profit repartition is dependent on the
particular solution found in the first stage. As there can be
many equivalent solutions for the first stage, this can lead
to unpredictable invoices that are unlikely to be accepted
by community members.
Method 2: A priori profit sharing
The second method we propose merges the two stages of
the first idea, and requires the definition of an a priori profit
repartition rule. Table 1 lists the principles we have used.
The first principle guarantees that invoices can easily be
determined for each entity. The second principle, coupled
with the first, guarantees that any contribution of an entity
to any cost or revenue stream is accounted for (account-
ability). The third principle guarantees that an optimum is
reachable, and in a reasonable amount of time (efficiency).
Table 1: A priori profit sharing principles.




2. Each cost or revenue stream is quantified.
3. The problem remains linear, or at least convex.
4. No entity suffers a profit degradation with respect to its
selfish profit: JMUu ≥ J?,SUu .
The last principle cannot cause a decrease of PMU with re-
spect to the solution of (4)–(7) as we allow profit transfer
between entities.
The algorithm proceeds as follows. Solve successively
1. problem (1)–(3) for each entity separately;
2. problem (4)–(7) for all entities, imposing also that
each entity does not decrease the profit obtained in
phase 1.
It is hard to determine the ”altruism level” of this method.
We rather compare its results to the third method described
below, which casts an alternative look at the problem.
Method 3: Equilibrium
The third method is inspired by [5] and attempts to get a
solution that is as close as possible to an ”utopian reparti-
tion”, where each entity would make a profit as if the com-
munity were operated with the objective to maximize its
selfish profit:
1. solve problem (4)–(7) for each entity, but with only
the objective for the member considered. Hence re-
place (4) by JMUu (·). This yields J?,utopianu , ∀u ∈U .
2. solve for a global equilibrium point, i.e. a solution
that is as close as possible to the ”utopian” goal of








where wu scales entities positions to account for large
entity size differences.
Phase 1 yields extreme solutions where the total profit may
be heavily degraded in favor of one entity. Phase 2 at-
tempts to find a solution that mitigates these extreme solu-
tions. Comparing results of methods 2 and 3 provide some
insight on their performance with respect to the altruism
notion.
Illustrative results
We provide some illustrative results on a case inspired by
the MeryGrid project [2], with four entities, among which
the storage system. We have set γc = γb = 0 in this illus-
trative experiment. Similarly, we have considered no peak
penalty. Other values will be studied during the project.
Method 2 is implemented as follows. A community price
is determined for each time step. The part of the profit
of an entity related to energy exchanges is thus function
of the product of this price and of the quantity exchanged,
which yields non-linear terms. To linearize this, we in-
troduce discrete price levels for community exchanges and
use a reformulation similar to [4]. Only symmetrical re-
serve is valorized on the market. Reserve of entities can be
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Table 2: Total profit and profit by entity with revenue
stacking for method 2 vs. local optimization (i.e. phase
1 of method 2) indicated by green and red deltas.
Table 3: Total profit and profit by entity with revenue
stacking for method 3, phase 2.
combined to form symmetrical reserve, and any reserve is
valorized in the community (accountability). The peak is
defined at the community level, but ”virtual” entity peaks
are computed to penalize each entity independently. How-
ever, the peak penalty is set to zero in this illustrative ex-
periment. Table 2 summarizes results of method 2. The
extra profit generated by the community is 113.54e. This
thus leaves some room for increasing γc. In this case, en-
tities gain some profit by exchanging energy through the
community. On the other hand the storage system can only
make profit by selling reserve to the market since γb = 0.
It is thus not used for the community, and increasing γb
would probably result in a profit increase for the commu-
nity. Method 3 uses the same model as method 2. We have
set wu = 1 for all entities. Phase 1 is solved in two steps:
first solve for an entity, then fix the solution for that en-
tity, restore the global objective, and resolve. This tends to
maintain an altruist mechanism. Table 3 shows the results
of method 3, which achieves a total profit a little smaller
than method 2. Table 4 illustrates phase 1 of method 3 for
a particular entity.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have proposed ways to operate a community microgrid
exploiting a complete set of revenue streams. Obviously,
implementing this community model comes with technical
challenges, that are currently under study in the MeryGrid
project, and implies adaptations to the current regulatory
framework. For instance (i) the market face meter of each
entity has to be corrected to account for the flows that stay
within the community, (ii) some components of the invoice
may now be paid at the community level (e.g. the peak
penalty). This work can be extended and complemented in
Table 4: Total profit and profit by entity with revenue
stacking for phase 1 of method 3, for entity 3 (green and
red deltas are differences with respect to corresponding
values in Table 3)
several directions. For instance, it is certainly worth ana-
lyzing settlement principles to reconcile forecasting errors
and other entity related behaviors.
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